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Ms. Marilyn Branch
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Branch:
Pursuant to Rule 24(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Defendant/Appellant Christopher Cheeney ("Appellant") hereby
notifies the Court of the following pertinent and significant
authority that came to Appellant's attention after the Reply
Brief was filed:
State v. Powasnik, Case No. 960116-CA (Utah Ct. App.
filed May 31, 1996).
A copy of the Powasnik decision is enclosed.
The Powasnik case pertains to the following page(s) of
Appellant's briefs in support of Appellant's argument that,
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)
(1995),1 the penalty enhancement provisions of Section

1

Subsection (5) (a) states that the gang enhancement provisions do
"not create any separate offense" (see Appellant's Brief, dated February
16, 1996, at 9-10); and subsection (5) (c) interferes with the factfinding functions of the jury by specifying that the "sentencing judge
rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section."
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76-3-203.1 add elements to the underlying offense that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury:
Reply Brief, dated June 3, 1996, at 10-11;
Brief of Appellant, dated February 16, 1996, at Point I.B.I.
The Statute Interferes with a Defendant's Right to Be
Presumed Innocent Until the Elements of the Offense Are
Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; and
Brief of Appellant, dated February 16, 1996, at Point I.B.2.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 Interferes with a Criminal
Defendant's Right to a Jury.
Respectfully yours,

(J
Linda M.
Attorney
Encl.

JonesQ
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered seven (7) copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four (4) copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this TUL

day of June,

1996.

7U(\^,~J
M. JONES

DELIVERED this

day of June, 1996.
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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State of Utah,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 96011S-CA

v.
Joseph P. Powasnik,
Defendant and Appellant

FILED
(May 31, 1996)

First District, Cache County
The Honorable Gordon J. Low
Attorneys:

Blaine Perry McBride, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Joseph P. Powasnik appeals his conviction for distribution
of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public park, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(5) (a) (ix) (1996) . The State concedes the trial court
incorrectly treated the issue of the offense's proximity to a
public park as a sentencing question rather than an element of
the offense to be decided by the jury. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand.
BACKGROUND
After an investigation by the Tri-County Narcotics Task
Force, officers arrested Powasnik. The State charged Powasnik
with distributing methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1996). The
State also alleged the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a
public park in Logan, Utah; thus, upon conviction Powasnik would
be subject to the penalties of a first degree felony pursuant to
section 58-37-8(5) of the Utah Code.

Before trial, the court announced it would proceed as
follows:
If the jury finds those facts [supporting
conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance] to be true beyond a reasonable
doubt, they may return a verdict of guilt.
When that occurs, if it does, the court,
then, would hear evidence from Mr. Jenkins in
behalf of the State as to if it occurred
within 1000 feet of a park. If I find beyond
a reasonable doubt that that in fact occurred
then there would be the enhancement.
The jury found Powasnik guilty of distributing a controlled
substance. Two weeks later, the trial court convened a bench
hearing to determine whether the offense occurred within 1000
feet of a public park.
At that hearing, the officer who measured the distance
between the residence where the drugs were sold and Merlin Olsen
Park testified it was 800 feet. The officer also testified he
did not Know whether the pedometer he used to measure the
distance had been calibrated. The State offered to provide
evidence of the pedometer's calibration or to remeasure the
distance. Rather than accept the State's offer, the trial court
instead asked the officer how many blocks separated the residence
in question from the park. The officer responded the residence
was approximately twenty feet from the corner of 200 East and 200
South, and the distance from there to the park was only one
block.
The trial court announced it would take judicial notice of
the length of blocks in Logan and the location of the house and
the park. The trial court further stated:
Whether this court can take judicial notice
or not, I am fully aware that the blocks in
Logan are about 800 feet. I'm not unfamiliar
with that location, it having been described
both at trial and otherwise. I find that in
fact the occurrence was within 1000 feet of a
park. The conviction, then, will be enhanced
to a first degree felony.
The trial court consequently sentenced Powasnik to a first degree
felony, and Powasnik now appeals.
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We address a single issue on appeal: whether the penalty
enhancement provisions of section 58-37-8(5) constitute an
element of the underlying offense that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decided guilt on
the predicate crime.1 A trial court's interpretation of a
statute is a question of law that we review for correctness.
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). We accord no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions arising from its
interpretation. See id.
ANALYSIS
It is well-established that defendants convicted of
distributing, possessing, or manufacturing controlled substances
are subject to enhanced penalties if their offense occurred
within 1000 feet of certain public places, such as schools and
public parks. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996); State v.
Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 502-05 (Utah 1989); State v. Viah, 871 P. 2d
1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 5861 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
And today we explicitly announce the penalty enhancement statute
adds an extra element to those drug offenses that must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides
the predicate offense.
In prior Utah cases interpreting the penalty
enhancement statute, the trier of fact for the predicate offense
always has been the same trier of fact who found the offense
occurred within the requisite 1000 feet of a specified public
place. See, e.g., Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1035. Here, on the other
hand, a jury found Powasnik guilty of distribution while the
trial court found the offense occurred within 1000 feet of a
public park. Powasnik's case thus presents a question of first
impression and requires us to interpret the relationship between
the subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) .
The penalty enhancement provision provides, in relevant
part:
Notwithstanding other provisions of this
section, a person not authorized under this
1. Because we conclude the trial court erred when it declined to
submit the issue of the 1000-foot penalty enhancement to the jury
and instead conducted its own "sentence enhancement hearing," we
do not analyze issues arising from that hearing.
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chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section . . . is upon
conviction subject to the f^nhancedl
penalties and classifications under
Subsection 5(b) if the act is committed fin,
on. or within 1000 feet of specified public

places! •
IsL. § 58-37-8 (5) (a) (1996) (emphasis added). The legislature
enacted the penalty enhancement statute in 1986 "to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare of children of Utah from the
presumed extreme potential danger created when drug transactions
occur on or near a school ground [or other public places
frequented by children]." Moore. 782 P.2d at 503. Thus, the
law's overarching purpose is to create "drug-free zones" around
schools and other specified places "to protect children from the
influence of drug-related activity." Strombercr, 783 P. 2d at 60.
The statute achieves that goal by increasing penalties for drug
offenses committed within 1000 feet of specified public places.
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996).
The text of the statute suggests the same trier of fact who
determines the underlying charge of distribution, manufacture, or
possession also must decide the question of distance. The phrase
"upon conviction" used together with the phrase "if the act is
committed" indicates that defendants' sentences will be enhanced
automatically when the trier of fact finds them guilty of
possession, distribution, or manufacturing and finds that they
committed the offense within 1000 feet of a prohibited place.
The penalty enhancement subsection depends upon the subsections
defining unlawful acts. The statute thus requires the same trier
of fact who found the defendant guilty of an underlying offense
to answer simultaneously the question of where the defendant
committed the offense.
Similarly, we previously have suggested the penalty
enhancement statute creates an additional element for the
underlying drug charge. In Stromberg. we observed, "the crime
for which defendant stands convicted is identical to the offense
of possessing controlled substances, except for the additional
element that the offense must occur with 1,000 feet of a school.11
783 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added). The penalty enhancement statute
incorporates questions of location and distance into the
underlying offense. The State must prove those additional facts
to the trier of fact who finds defendants guilty of the predicate
crime. £££ McMillan v. Pennsylvania. 477 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S. Ct.
2411, 2415 (1986) (observing "'the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.'" (quoting In re Winshio, 397 U.S. 358,
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364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970))). In essence, the penalty
enhancement constitutes a distinct crime separate and apart from
possession, distribution, or manufacture of a controlled
substance.
Utah modeled its drug penalty enhancement statute after the
Federal Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984.
See Tape of House Floor Debates, 44th Legislature, General
Session (Feb. 12, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Moss); see also Vigh.
871 P.2d at 1035; Strombercr. 783 P.2d at 59 n.3. Compare 21
U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994) (federal penalty enhancement provision)
with Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (1996) (Utah's penalty
enhancement provision) . Federal case law thus serves as
persuasive authority in determining the proper procedure for
prosecuting the 1000-foot penalty enhancement.
Federal courts uniformly have held the penalty enhancement
statute creates an additional element for the underlying crime
that must be proved to the same trier of fact. See, e.g.. United
States v. Ashley. 26 F.3d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir.) (collecting
similar cases), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 348 (1994); United
States v. Smith. 13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating
statute "constitutes an 'offense' which has as an element of
proof that the distribution occurred within 1,000 feet of a
protected place'1); United States v. Freyre-Lazaro. 3 F.3d 1496,
1507 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding predicate crime is lesser included
offense of penalty enhancement statute), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct.
1385 (1994); United States v. Scott. 987 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir.
1993) (same); United States v, ThcrntQU, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating statute "incorporates the sentencing
enhancement element into the underlying offense"); United States
v. Holland. 810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (stating statute
"adds an element to the offense" that must be "proved"), cert.

denied, 481 u.s. 1057, 107 s. ct. 2199 (1987).
In the present case, the trial court incorrectly reserved
the issue of the 1000-foot penalty enhancement for a separate
sentencing hearing. The trial court failed to note and
effectuate the relationship between the several subsections of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). Section 58-37-8(5)
"incorporates the sentencing enhancement element into the
underlying offense." Thornton. 901 F.2d at 741. Consequently,
the question of where the underlying drug offense took place must
be determined by the same trier of fact who decides whether
defendants are guilty of possession, distribution, or manufacture
of a controlled substance.
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CONCLUSION
We hold Utah's drug penalty enhancement statute creates an
additional element: for the underlying offenses of distribution,
possession, or manufacture of a controlled substance. That
additional element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to
the same trier of fact who decides the predicate crime. The
State concedes the trial court incorrectly reserved the issue of
the 1000-foot penalty enhancement until Powasnik's sentencing.
Accordingly, we vacate Powasnik's conviction for a first-degree
felony, enter a judgment of conviction for a second-degree
felony, and remand to the trial court for imposition of
sentence.2

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

2. Utah appellate
enter judgments of
appeal. Utah Code
P.2d 1201, 1209-11
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courts may modify criminal convictions and
conviction for a lesser included offense on
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995); ^ a f p v. Dunn. 850
(Utah 1993).
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